Archive for category Fair Use

Should Songwriters want to get paid for 30 second previews?

A recent article at Ars Technica alerted me to the news that songwriters want to get paid a license fee for 30 second previews.  Since even the smallest sample requires a license this makes legal sense.  However there would seem to be a fair use argument as the preview could be considered not commercial (don’t get me started on why that shouldn’t be part of the standard but it is) and presumably leads to increased sales (thus not hurting the would be licensor.)

Since the preview should lead to increased sales, should songwriters be getting paid a license fee?  It seems to me that Amazon, Apple, and whoever else is offering 30 second previews should call songwriters’ bluffs here and pull all of the previews.  My assumption is that music sales would go down as people would only buy songs they already know they want and would be less likely to be extra songs on a whim.  Assuming this is correct the decrease in music sales would pressure the songwriters to give up on their license demands for previews.  Additionally record companies would supply pressure also as they would be losing money as well.

The songwriters demands appear to me to be a poorly thought out method of trying to increase their license for paid music downloads without renegotiating the license agreement.

Of course my whole theory could be rendered moot if people just find other (less legal) ways to preview songs (and continue to buy the same amount of music)

P.S. I found a great cartoon but don’t have $10 for the license fee. Check it out here

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Where Blogging and Branding Clash

EverydayFoodieYesterday my girlfriend alerted me to a post over at one of the food blogs she follows.  The blogger had received a cease and desist letter from a major brand alleging trademark infringement. After receiving legal advice the blogger has decided to abide the cease and desist letter despite a relatively strong legal position.

The post goes on to complain about the cease and desist tactic.  However I believe her response is one of the very reasons this tactic continues to be used where it shouldn’t be.  Instead of asking the brand to justify its position the blogger has acceded to their outrageous demands.  The attorney who sent the demand can report beak that he successfully defended the brand without mention the potentially devastating brand tarnishment that occurred by treating  a popular food blogger as a criminal.

We the people are stuck in a legal catch-22.  We continue to receive cease and desist letters and take down notices which border on ridiculous.  However fighting them can put oneself in an untenable position.  Having to fight a legal war against a large corporation with significant legal resources.  As a result the cease and desist letters and take down notices become more frequent as attorneys can cite their high success rate.

Until someone fights back and can get a judge to award a major penalty for sending unwarranted cease and desist letter corporate attorneys can continue to  blindly send out unjustifiable take down notices and claim victory.  The sad truth is that no one is winning.  The brands that the attorneys represent lose major PR and brand loyalty every time one of these letters is sent to someone it shouldn’t have been.

There is hope though!  United States District Judge Jeremy Fogel, denied a motion to dismiss in a lawsuit filed by Stephanie Lenz against Universal Music alleging misrepresentation pursuant to a DMCA take down notice. Fogel also held that copyright owners must consider fair use before sending take down notices.

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No Fair Use at Copyright Office

I discovered something interesting by accident today. If you go to http://www.copyright.gov/laws/

http://www.copyright.gov/laws/ screenshot

http://www.copyright.gov/laws/ screenshot

Now click on the “Fair Use” link.

You discover that Fair Use does not exist!

Fair Use link screenshot

Fair Use link screenshot

Conspiracy or honest mistake?

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The Case for Digital Casebooks

Kindle DX

In connection with the recent release of the Kindle DX, I have been reading a lot about how the Kindle and digital books will affect law school and lawyers.  (Also the bankrupt state of California just announced it would begin using open source, digital textbooks in schools.)  Considering laptops fill modern day law school classrooms, digital law school casebooks seems like a no-brainer.  Students would be able to carry all of their casebooks with them everywhere, search for a particular phrase or case easily, and copy and paste phrases into notes.  With the wealth of e-reader and pdf technology available, highlighting and making notes in the margins is as easy on digital copies as it is on physical ones.

The more I think about the usefulness of having digital copies of my law school books the more I am surprised they are not currently widely available.  I would definitely pay an extra $20 to have both a physical and digital copy of my casebooks.  I would never have to haul the heavy books with me to class.  Nor would I have to prioritize which books to take with me since they don’t all fit in any bag I am willing or able to bike to class with.  Unfortunately, digital copies of casebooks are limited at best.  Presumably one of the major reasons is the fear of the books being pirated online.  While DRM is an obvious solution, the successes and failures of DRM make it a less than ideal one.

Pirated BooksIn the meantime, one blog I found advocates manually converting physical casebooks to digital ones.  While this raises major copyright and fair use issues, it also demonstrates that digital copies are already available.  Consider again the laptop filled law school classrooms.  Do you believe that these students will continue to be satisfied with physical copies of their books?  I believe the market demand for digital casebooks is just beginning to rise and thus legal publishers ought to figure out a way to publish digitally for a profit before pirated books fill the void.


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Yahoo v. NFL Players Association, Inc.

yahooffMy initial reaction to the news of yahoo filing suit against the NFLPA was shock. Shock that this wasn’t already an established issue in Yahoo’s favor. (In fact I had just talked to my dad the day before about how courts had held sports statistics as facts when we were discussing the Seinfeld Aptitude Test case.)

However the NFLPA’s alleged threat to file suit against Yahoo  and the decision in their favor (Gridiron.com, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, Player’s Ass’n, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1309, (S.D. Fla. 2000)) made me realize the issue was far from established. Similarly Yahoo’s decision to file in Minnesota (far away from it’s Sunnyvale headquarters) is now obvious as well. The court in Minnesota has already decided a similar case in CBS Interactive Inc., v. NFLPA, Inc.

Unfortunately I don’t have hours and hours to dissect the courts’ differing decisions. However a quick review of both decisions revealed the following:

In CBS the MN court found that the 8th circuit court’s precedent in CBC v. MLBPA applied to the facts of the case.* The NFLPA fought the summary judgment motion on a number of procedural ground but no substantive grounds. Thus after finding none of the procedural grounds persuasive the court granted CBS’ summary judgment motion with little analysis. The court did note that:

The printouts of CBS Interactive’s website fail to demonstrate specific facts that support the assertion that the manner in which CBS Interactive presents the package of player information could give the false impression of an endorsement. The manner in which the information appears does not demonstrate or imply any connection between the players and the advertisement such that one could mistakenly believe that an endorsement is being made.

Put simply since the player’s information in connection with the fantasy football website is not an endorsement.

In Gridiron.com the court made the opposite conclusion:

Plaintiff uses these players to promote their websites in order to solicit third party advertisements. The websites, in and of themselves, are products, based on certain comments made by Plaintiff, the interpretation of the GLA by the NFLPA and the NFL Players, and by the plain meaning of the term describing the aggregation of the Players’ sites and the fantasy football game. The cases cited by Plaintiff do not stand for the proposition that a website is not a product.

Thus the court in Gridiron found the player’s information on the websites an endorsement. Additionally the court found that Gridiron’s use was not protected by the first amendment.

MLB Ad Parody

MLB Ad Parody

Plaintiff seeks to utilize the players it contracts with to use their images and have them perform functions that go way beyond merely conveying the news...Plaintiff actively sought out and obtained over 150 NFL Player’s publicity rights, and now argues that the information the websites produce are entitled to Free Speech protection. Plaintiff’s argument is not persuasive.

So what do you think? Are fantasy sports sites’ use of players’ statistics, biographical information, and images endorsements or relevant factual information?

One final note in CBS the NFLPA argued that “it is not clear whether the public’s interest in football statistics is equal in degree to the interest in baseball statistics, and, therefore, ‘there may be . . . weaker First Amendment interests at stake in this case.’” I would love to see MLB try and turn this into an advertising campaign. Even the NFLPA thinks baseball is better ….

* For a detailed analysis of CBC v. MLBPA see 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1439

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Sotomayor and IP Part 1: Castle Rock v. Carol Publishing

In an attempt to understand the Supreme Court nominee’s take on IP law, I have re-read her decision in Castle Rock v. Carol Publishing (written when she was a district court judge.) Hopefully Sotomayor’s analysis of this difficult case (I believe it is a close call on the fair use issue) will be informative of her stance on IP.

For those that don’t know (or remember) Castle Rock involved the publishing of the Seinfeld Aptitude Test (SAT) a trivia book published without authorization.

Originality of Seinfeld – Carol Publishing claimed they were not reproducing original expression but rather “uncopyrightable facts about the Seinfeld show.” Sotomayor held that the facts depicted in a Seinfeld episode are fiction and thus original creation.

“In other words, by copying “facts” that plaintiff invented, SAT “appropriate[s] [plaintiffs] original contributions.”

Sotomayor found support for her conclusion in NBA v. Motorola where the 2nd circuit held that basketball stats were facts and thus protected by the Copyright Act in part because “[u]nlike movies, plays, television programs, or operas, athletic events have no underlying script.”

Fair Use
Purpose and character of the use:
Sotomayor held that the purpose of the SAT fit the non-exclusive purposes that §107 identifies as fair use. (this is one of the only points the 2nd circuit disagreed with her on. Therefore I believe this analysis is particularly insightful as it demonstrates a departure from the status quo.)

She held:

Though it may be “extravagant” to characterize SAT as a work of criticism or comment, the Court “must be alert to the risk of permitting subjective judgments about quality to tilt the scales on which the fair use balance is made.” Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1374. Surely a text testing one’s knowledge of Joyce’s Ulysses,or Shakespeare’s Hamlet, would qualify as “criticism, comment, scholarship, or research,” or such. The same must be said, then, of a text testing one’s knowledge of Castlerock’s Seinfeld. Id. (“A comment is as eligible for fair use protection when it concerns ‘Masterpiece Theater’ and appears in the New York Review of Books as when it concerns ‘As the World Turns’ and appears in Soap Opera Digest.”)

Sotomayor’s analysis indicates a broad view of comment/criticism.  This is in line with a broad finding of fair use and heavy first amendment protection.

Transformative:
Following the Supreme Court decision in Campbell Sotomayor holds that the SAT is itself an “original creation” and adds something new to Seinfeld. She again appears to take a wide view of fair use:

Put differently, the analysis properly focuses upon whether “the new work merely ‘supersedes the objects’ of the original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”

Following this focus Sotomayor  holds that the SAT by posing trivia questions is an original creation. However, Sotomayor diminishes the importance of this holding by disclaiming that a transformative work can still infringe (citing derivative works infringing on originals.)  Sotomayor adds that the issue of whether a work is transformative is most important where it is not (and thus should be rejected from further fair use consideration.)

Commercial Endeavor:
Sotomayor states that SAT’s commercial nature “tempers, if only slightly” a finding of fair use.  Again citing Campbell Sotomayor recognizes that almost everything in the US is published for profit and thus a finding of a commercial endeavor is of little consideration to a finding of fair use.

Substantiality of the Portion Used:
Sotomayor analyzes both the amount and substantiality of the work used with reference to Seinfeld as well as the amount of the SAT consisting of Seinfeld material.  Furthermore Sotomayor holds that:

The Court’s determination that SAT is substantially similar to Seinfeld “so as to be prima facie infringing should suffice for a determination that the third fair use factor favors the plaintiff.”

While Sotomayor holds that Carol Publishing appropriated the most important elements of Seinfeld, she again minimizes the importance of her conclusion:

Because a finding of substantial similarity is a prerequisite to a prima facie claim of infringement, such a finding cannot negate the possibility of fair use. Otherwise, the fair use provision of the Copyright Act would amount to little more than a false promise of a viable defense; there would be no real chance that a prima facie case of infringement could ever be negated by a showing of fair use. The first three factors of the fair use analysis, then, suggest a somewhat unsatisfying result; plaintiff has an advantage, but one that is hardly compelling or dispositive.

(The Second Circuit court takes a different analysis of the 3rd fair use factor.  They hold that the question of substantiality is in relation to the purpose of the work and thus since the purpose of the work is “entertainment, not commentary” the amount and substantiality of the use must weigh against fair use.  Interestingly both analyses minimize the substantiality of the portion used factor based on an early finding essentially making the third fair use factor unnecessary.)

Affect on Potential Markets:
Sotomayor cites the Supreme Courts opinion in Harper that the “effect on the market for the copyrighted work is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”  This is important in that it minimizes the courts retreat in Campbell “[a]ll [factors] are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”  Thus it appears that while minimizing the commercial nature of the work in the first factor she places more weight on the commercial effect. In a footnote Sotomayor explains her position stating that

Given the vigor with which the Supreme Court has emphasized this factor in the past, this Court hesitates in adapting the Second Circuit’s dicta. In any event, because neither party has any considerable advantage through the Court’s consideration of the first three fair use factors, the effect on the potential markets-however important it is relative to the remaining factors-will be determinative in this case.

While Sotomayor holds that the book compliments Seinfeld in that it is only valuable to a regular viewer of the program (and thus is not replacing the original), she still finds that the SAT has a deleterious effect on the potential market:

A Seinfeld trivia game is not critical of the program, nor does it parody the program; if anything, SAT pays homage to Seinfeld. The market for such works is one that should properly be left to plaintiff’s exclusive control.

Sotomayor’s analysis focuses on whether the potential market is one the creators would develop or license.  Specifically Sotomayor states:

The examples of parody and criticism should serve to clarify and illustrate this proposition. By the very nature of such endeavors, persons other than the copyright holder are undoubtedly better equipped, and more likely, to fill these particular market and intellectual niches.

Thus it appears that Sotomayor believes a finding for fair under the potential market factor would require the work to be of a critical nature to the  original work.

Finally Sotomayor considers Castle Rock’s failure to enter the market for trivia books. Sotomayor states:

The Court is persuaded that there is a meaningful difference, for purposes of the Copyright Act, between a copyright holder’s failure to occupy a particular market as a matter of choice, and a failure to occupy such a market as a matter of neglect.

Interestingly this implies that if an infringer could prove that a copyright holder failed to occupy a marker out of neglect that it would weigh in favor of a finding for fair use.

Conclusions:
Sotomayor concludes on the balance that the factors weigh against a finding of fair use. Her analysis appears to reveal a broader view of fair use with respect to categories of works and whether a work is transformative. Paradoxically she states that the commercial nature of the infringing work is of little weight, and then places a large amount of weight on the effect on potential markets.  Combined with her broad view of potential markets the commercial nature of a infringing work becomes the determinative factor (especially considering she discounts the substantiality of the portion used factor.)  Thus it appears that a finding of fair use is likely only where the use is either noncommercial or criticizes/parodies the copyrighted work.

To be continued …

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iPhone, DMCA, Fair Use, and the new blog

Welcome to the new and improved runwiththelaw.com!  Sorry for the vacation from posting (you can blame law school finals – I did.)  At any rate I have migrated over to wordpress and combined my running blog with my legal blog.  So far I am super happy with it. (Once I figure out how to keep the running posts off the front page it will be perfect.)

More importantly, I missed a TON of legal stuff during finals.  While pouring through my google reader I have found a few things I have to comment on.  First update was this post over at EFF re:Apple’s iPhone policy

For those too lazy to read the link, Apple refused to approve a public domain book reader because one of the public domain books is the Kama Sutra.  (What happened to the First Amendment?)  While some people may be okay with Apple censoring their phones I am not and neither is the DMCA.

In 2006 the Copyright Office granted a 3 year exemption under the DMCA which allows users to circumvent software that lock phones to one provider.  In other words “jailbreaking” iPhones is currently legal.  However it may not stay that way for long; the Copyright Office is currently re-evaluating the exemptions (which it does every 3 years) and Apple has petitioned for “jailbreaking” iPhones to be illegal.  Thankfully organizations like the EFF have petitioned the copyright office to keep the exemption.

As a side note none of these exemptions would be necessary if users where considered owners for the purposes of the First Sale Doctrine (but that is a whole nother post.)  If corporation as “hip” as Apple are going to censor what you can do with your cell phone then this exemption is more necessary than ever.

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My Problem with EULAs

The great thing about law school (when taught properly) is that it fosters discussion. Yesterday in my Advanced Copyright’s class we were discussing Reverse Engineering. As a result of the discussion, I finally figured out how to articulate my problem with End User License Agreements (EULAs.) As some of you know, it was my own encounter with reverse engineering and EULAs which sparked my interest in law school in the first place.

The problem with EULAs, other than that everyone agrees to them without reading them, is that they often preempt Federal Copyright Law (in my opinion.)

The constitution states “Congress shall have Power . . . To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times, to Authors and Inventors, the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”

When Congress codified copyright law with the Copyright Act of 1909, they granted copyright protection beginning at the moment of publication. The key, in my opinion, is that limited time monopolies are granted in exchange for publication. Therefore the exclusive rights federal copyright protection guarantees are a quid pro quo for sharing the work with the public. Furthermore, the list of exclusive rights is not exhaustive but rather specific and limited. EULAs violate these principles when they expressly withhold fair use rights or other rights not exclusively granted to the copyright holder by the Copyright Act. Put simply they are not their rights to give!

For example Apple’s Itunes EULA states “you may not copy, decompile, reverse engineer, disassemble, modify, or create derivative works of the Apple Software or any part thereof.” (A similar clause can be found in almost every software EULA.) However most courts have held that reverse engineering is a fair use as a matter of law. See Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1529 (9th Cir. 1993). Therefore, Apple is expressly limiting a fair use in their EULA and thereby taking away a right the courts have held limits a copyright holders exclusive rights.

While parties are generally free to contract to whatever they wish, the Supreme Court has invalidated contracts it held to be contrary to federal law. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins 395 U.S. 653 (1969). To that end I believe provisions in EULAs similar to Apple’s which limit rights not exclusively granted to copyright holders should not be enforced as a matter of federal law preemption.

For more info see:
I. Trotter Hardy, Contracts, Copyright and Preemption in a Digital World, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2 (1995

Daniel Laster, “The Secret Is Out: Patent Law Preempts Mass Market License Terms Barring Reverse Engineering for Interoperability Purposes” (February 17, 2006). bepress Legal Series. Working Paper 975.

P.S. A big thank you to Ron Coleman for linking to my blog. This post is a hurried attempt to get more content up in hopes that the increased traffic sparks more discussion.

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